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ARTICLE
The cultural turn in intelligence studies
Simon Willmetts
ABSTRACT
This article explores an emerging “cultural turn” in intelligence studies,
which, if fully realized, could entail the expansion of the discipline to
include new methodologies and theories, and a more integrative under-
standing of historical causality that locates intelligence agencies within
the widersocio-cultural domain they inhabit. It has two parts. The first-
expands upon what I mean by a new ‘integrative’ understanding of
historical causality. The second explores three areas of interest for intelli-
gence scholars where the “cultural turn” has clear and important impli-
cations: the study of secrecy, publicity, and “mentalities”.
In recent years a new wave of scholarship, focusing upon the representation of secret intelligence
services in various media, has added new vitality to the discipline of intelligence studies.1 It is
tempting, therefore, to identify this topical interest in the popular mediation of intelligence
agencies as the titular ‘cultural turn’ of this article, and leave it at that. But topicality alone cannot
constitute a disciplinary ‘turn’. At stake in this expansion of the discipline to include a consideration
of ‘culture’ is something much more fundamental than simply a question of what topics are
permissible. In this article I will argue that two conditions are necessary for a fully fledged cultural
turn in intelligence studies: the first is an openness to new methodologies and theoretical para-
digms, often borrowed from other disciplines, and in particular from the fields of cultural studies,
literary theory and the philosophy of history. The second is a new understanding of historical
causality that is integrative, recognising that intelligence, as with the rest of the political domain,
‘does not constitute itself independent of and external to society – but is a place of almost
continuous sociopolitical interaction.’ Intelligence scholars, to borrow Steven Pincus and William
Novak’s wording, ‘should not assume that their chosen area of inquiry can be studied abstracted
from other elements of historical experience.’2 Nor, it should be added, are many of those other
elements of historical experience entirely abstracted from the history of secret intelligence.
This article is therefore not intended as a comprehensive literature review of recent cultural
studies of intelligence, though it does identify what this author considers some of the more
significant works that assume one or both of the conditions described above. Nor is it a purely
descriptive account of a ‘cultural turn’ in intelligence studies that has already occurred. Rather, it
seeks to extrapolate from an emerging tendency within the field, a nascent cultural turn if you will,
still in the making, in order to outline some guiding principles for its future development, as well as
explore some of its implications for the study of intelligence. There are two sections to this article.
The first expands upon what I mean by a new ‘integrative’ understanding of historical causality,
and contrasts it with traditional historical approaches to intelligence studies. The second explores
three key areas of interest for intelligence scholars where this new paradigm has clear and
important implications: the study of secrecy, publicity, and ‘mentalities’, or the cultural baggage
that accompanies and inspires intelligence practitioners. The implications of a fully fledged cultural
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turn in intelligence studies need not be limited to these domains, but it is in these domains where
integrative and methodologically innovative approaches have already begun to emerge.
To avoid the kind of hostile misinterpretation that often accompanies interventions of this
nature, I wish to end this introduction with a plea to the reader, particularly those wedded to more
‘traditional’ methodologies. This is not intended as a rejection of politics, or political approaches to
the study of intelligence. Indeed, if anything, the opposite is true; the opening up of intelligence
studies to new terrains beyond what was traditionally considered ‘political’ (i.e., the state) expands
and extends the range of political enquiry. Rather than rejecting traditional approaches to the
study of secret intelligence, this article proceeds from the assumption that embracing new
methodologies, and adopting a more integrative understanding of historical causality, an under-
standing that sees intelligence agencies as enmeshed in a complex ecosystem of political, social
and cultural phenomena, can only augment the discipline and extend the reach and significance of
its conclusions. Perhaps the reason that intelligence studies is sometimes described as a ‘ghetto’ of
diplomatic history and international relations is because its practitioners have hitherto not been
bold enough in noting the profound impact of their object of study upon wider society, and its
momentous political reverberations beyond the corridors of state.3
It would, however, be disingenuous to deny the critical intent of this article. The cultural turn in
intelligence studies, as I conceive it here, has a sting in the tail, but its implications, if fully grappled
with, should prove salutary rather than destructive. As I have described elsewhere, a full reckoning
with the range of cultural and critical theory that has parsed the relationship between representa-
tion and reality necessitates a rejection of what Hans Kellner has described as the authoritarian
discourse of reality.4 The unavoidable corollary of recognising that the reality of intelligence is
always, to an extent, culturally constructed, is a degree of critical introspection on behalf of
intelligence scholars who still regard themselves as the arbiters of historical authenticity, standing
as bulwarks against the tide of fantasists and conspiracy theorists who have deceived the wider
public about the role and function of intelligence services. Such introspection is categorically not a
descent into historical relativism, where the narratives of the most crazed internet blogger (or
President of the United States) can stand on the same footing as an experienced scholar who has
spent decades in the archive. But it is a reckoning nonetheless, and a realisation that just as
intelligence services carry their own cultural baggage, so too do intelligence scholars. Recognising
the frailty of our own discipline, the inherently vulnerable yet creative enterprise of constructing
meaning from an actively distorted and partially concealed archive of documentary material, is the
only pathway to a more honest, diverse, and theoretically complex discipline. In this, I share in the
opinion of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, that robust deliberation and critical self-awareness is
the pathway to more effective intelligence agencies, just as it is the key to the vitality of any
academic discipline.5
Towards an integrative understanding of historical causality in intelligence studies
Customarily, this would be the moment at which, as a faithful political scientist, I should bemoan the
nebulousness of previous attempts to define the central concept of this article, and instead offer my
own, more precise, definition. Unfortunately, ‘culture’, as Raymond Williams famously noted, ‘is one of
the two or three most complicated words in the English language.’6 Its many meanings, and its many
applications across a range of academic disciplines, make a concise definition more or less impossible.
When we talk about culture, we mean different things in different contexts. Williams noted four core
usages of the term in the modern world. The first is the notion of culture as a form of ‘intellectual,
spiritual and aesthetic development’, which was a metaphoric application of the original medieval
usage of the term in relation to agricultural cultivation or husbandry.7 The second usage is basically as
synonym for ‘civilisation’, indicating a ‘general process of social development’, with all the Nineteenth-
Century baggage of social Darwinism that such a teleological view of human societies entailed. The
third ‘denotes the objects of artistic production’: novels, films, paintings, etc.8 The fourth relates to the
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 801
anthropological sense of the term – understanding particular human societies in terms of their shared
symbols, behaviours and systems of meaning. For good reason, it is the third and fourth usages of the
term, culture as artistic representation and culture as shared behaviours and systems of meaning, that
have most interested intelligence studies scholars. More specifically, for the purposes of analytical
clarity, we might choose to break-up the ‘cultural’ intelligence studies literature into two camps: the
study of media representations of espionage, including the study of spy fiction; and the more
anthropological attempt to determine specific intelligence ‘cultures’, usually borrowing the notion of
strategic culture from war studies and applying it to an understanding of the specific norms and
customs of certain intelligence agencies.
As I have detailed elsewhere, two approaches to spy fiction and the representation of espionage
in popular media are pre-eminent within the discipline.9 The first, what I call the ‘mythbusting’
approach, offers, in its crudest form, a balance sheet of the myths and realities of espionage, setting
fictional characters and events against their real-life counterparts, and pointing out the inconsis-
tencies between these two columns in the ledger of historical authenticity. The second dominant
approach looks for the ‘real-world impact’ of popular representations upon the work and devel-
opment of intelligence agencies. I will call this the ‘consequentialist’ approach to the study of
representation, borrowing the term from ethical philosophy to reflect the sense in which the
practitioners of this approach see the value of culture only in terms of its ‘real world’ effects. For
example, numerous articles have noted the influence of early spy novelists such as William Le
Queux and Erskine Childers with their German invasion fantasies, upon the early development and
expansion of Britain’s intelligence services.10 Likewise, recent studies have also suggested that Ian
Fleming’s James Bond had more than just a passing influence upon the early history and culture of
the US Central Intelligence Agency.11 I have raised objections to both of these approaches on
alternative grounds before, but here I want to reflect upon the form of historical causality that is
adopted, perhaps unconsciously, by both of these approaches, and indicate some of its limitations.
Both the ‘mythbusting’ and the ‘consequentialist’ approaches to the study of popular repre-
sentations of espionage adopt a mechanistic or linear understanding of the relationship between
culture and intelligence. This is most commonly characterised by the billiard ball analogy, ‘in which
homogenous but atomized elements bounce off each other in a linear and unique sequence
lacking any general structure beyond the cumulative effects of the series of individual collisions.’12
In the consequentialist approach, this analogy is quite obviously applicable – the value of a
particular cultural text is understood in terms of the change it has affected upon the historical
development of the espionage services. Sometimes this interaction between the two domains is
understood as more enmeshed, in particular, the oft-noted phenomenon of former spies writing
fictional novels that reveal guarded truths about their former places of employment.13 Yet even
these types of study tend to establish a linear causal argument, exploring how a novelist’s former
career as an intelligence officer might have seeped into their writing.
In the ‘mythbusting’ approach to spy fiction, the causal relationship between culture and ‘real’
intelligence breaks down almost entirely. Here spy fictions are derided by professional historians,
and often former or current intelligence officers, precisely because they are regarded as being so
far removed from the real world of espionage, a world that only the initiated can accurately
describe.14 Culture here is seen to have little or no value, and is a valid subject of enquiry only in so
far as an analysis of these texts allows the intelligence scholar to understand the extent of the
misinformation about the world of espionage that a gullible public consumes. Ironically, those
same intelligence officers who dismiss the negative fictions of their profession as bunk, are often
prepared to utilise more glamorous or positive mythologies to seduce the public. Culture can
legitimate as much as it can disparage the work of intelligence agencies, and the decision to
dismiss a particular fiction as just that, pure fiction, appears often to have as much to do with one’s
politics and attitude towards the intelligence services, rather than a genuine commitment to
historical authenticity.15
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The more ‘anthropological’ attempts to understand different ‘intelligence cultures’ (although in
reality approaches to this research problem have tended to be more historical than genuinely
anthropological), concern themselves, understandably enough, with the values, attitudes and
mores that exist within particular intelligence agencies. Such studies have ranged from the
insightful, to, in the words of Philip Davies, ‘self-flattering platitudes of the Vincent Pearl variety’,
such as the notion that US intelligence officers demonstrate a ‘can do attitude’.16 But though some
of these studies have identified clear and influential features of particular intelligence agencies,
what is more debateable, is whether these features are genuinely ‘cultural’ in nature, or whether
they are in fact caused by ‘cultural’ sensibilities.
For example, is the oft-cited technophilia of the US intelligence services genuinely a cultural
trait?17 Or is the explanation more economic in nature – i.e., expensive technical projects lead to
bigger budgets, and the bigger budgets of the US intelligence community (relative to other
intelligence services around the world) allowed it to invest more heavily in technology? This is
not to rule out the idea that, for example, CIA officials are genuine technology enthusiasts, but
without a focus upon mentalities and attitudes that undergird key decisions, it is impossible to
know. This is in part because of the tendency of intelligence historians working in this sub-field to
focus upon outcomes rather than motives, leading at times to post hoc ergo propter hoc logical
fallacies. To return to our example, simply because the CIA invested in satellite technology, it does
not necessarily follow that their motives for doing so were driven by cultural technophilia. It could
follow, but the motives cannot be assumed by the outcomes.
Another limitation of such studies is they tend to assume that intelligence cultures spring like
Minerva from the intelligence services themselves. Mark Stout, for example, traces contemporary US
intelligence culture to US intelligence activities during the First World War.18 But what about the
received values and predilections that intelligence officers bring with them from the world beyond the
shadowy realm? New recruits might well be inculcated into a particular organisational culture, but
values, attitudes and belief-systems, in-short, mentalities, run much deeper, and are forged out of what
RaymondWilliams described as ‘structures of feeling’, whose sources are broad and drawn from a wide
variety of influences. Simply put, we are much more complex creatures than the work we do.
As with the two dominant approaches to cultural representations of espionage, the mechanistic
billiard ball notion of causality applies – intelligence is portrayed as a hermetically sealed world
with little or no structural relationship to wider society and culture. It is conceived as a domain
apart, quite understandable given that official secrecy actively seeks to seal if off from the outside
world. But no intelligence agency is an island. Their activities are shaped and suffused by extrinsic
cultural values, just as those same cultural values can be warped by the activities of intelligence
agencies. I will provide more substantive examples of this enmeshing of intelligence with the
outside world in the next section, but before doing so I want to propose a different model of
historical causality that accounts for this entanglement.
There are many implements in the toolbox of cultural theory that could be utilised here to
overcome the disciplinary inclination to separate what is considered the properly political from
other domains of human experience. Clifford Geertz, perhaps the singularly most influential figure
upon the cultural interpretation of social practice, developed a reciprocal hermeneutics in which
rituals, ‘deep games’ or ‘collectively sustained symbolic structures’ both embody and shape social
and political practices.19 Claude Lévis-Strauss, Northrop Frye, Hayden White and many others have
argued, in different ways, for the unavoidably political implications of narrative structures, which
are taken, in the words of Fredric Jameson, to be ‘the central function or instance of the human
mind’, and sole means by which meaning is constructed out of the otherwise unintelligible
salmagundi of historical experience.20 Raymond Williams noted the perpetual ‘ordinariness’ of
culture as an everyday practice. To transpose Williams’ idea to our own field, we might say that
the seemingly pedestrian work of intelligence analysis requires creative acts just as the penning of
a spy novel out of historical experience involves leaps of imagination.21 Stuart Hall regarded culture
as the ‘arena of consent and resistance’, where hegemonic ideologies are secured, but also the site
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from which forms of ideational opposition can emerge.22 We could continue this roll-call of
canonical cultural theorists for many pages, suffice to say, all have grappled with the question of
the relationship, or more precisely, the interrelationship, between the cultural, the social, and the
political – indeed this is the defining feature of cultural studies as opposed to other forms of
aesthetic interpretive practice that privilege the text as a site of meaning in itself.
For the purposes of this argument, I will choose to focus upon Louis Althusser’s articulation of
Marx’s untranslatable concept of ‘Darstellung’ in terms of what he calls ‘structural causality’, or ‘the
concept whose object is precisely to designate the mode of presence of the structure in its effects’.
In other words, Althusser conceives a structural unity between the apparently separate domains of
human activity (the cultural, the political, the economic). This ‘totality’, as Marxists are inclined to
describe it, ‘is merely a specific combination of its peculiar elements, (and) is nothing outside (of) its
effects.’23 Of course for Althusser, as well as for Fredric Jameson, whose book The Political
Unconscious offers the fullest and most significant elaboration of Althusser’s concept, that struc-
tural unity of effects (totality) is nothing less than dialectical materialism itself. But one needn’t
subscribe to a Marxist teleology to find significance in Jameson’s Althusserian theoretical
underpinning.24 For Jameson, as for Althusser, there was no such thing as an independent variable
– if political structures change, so to do cultural forms, and vice versa. It is not a case of reading
culture as an interpretation of political reality, or politics as the consequence of cultural values,
rather, it is to see historical events and periods for what they are – multifarious and polysemous –
or comprised of many different elements, and thus capable of conveying many different forms of
meaning. Imagine, for example, attempting to give a full account of the 9/11 terrorist attacks
without one of the following elements: the political history of US foreign policy in the Middle East;
the development of terrorist tactics over time; the imagination of disaster in Hollywood films and
television shows which the spectacle of the attacks so directly and deliberately emulated; the
emotions of fear, anger and revenge that dictated the US response to the attacks; the political
rituals and forms of memorialisation that have emerged since; the relative degree of preparedness
of the US intelligence community for this kind of attack, etc. The answer is that the event we call 9/
11 was comprised of all of these things, to ignore one of these aspects would be to offer an
incomplete account. 9/11 is the sum of all of these things.
Just as it is at the level of the event, so too with historical periodisation. The periods that most
interest Jameson, Althusser and other Marxist cultural critics, of course, are the different modes of
production that ultimately unify these disparate elements. But for our purposes, we could choose
to adopt this periodising approach on a less grand scale. For example, what about periods of time
in which intelligence agencies find themselves the subject of particular scepticism – let’s take the
mid-1970s US intelligence community as an example, and in particular the so-called ‘Year of
Intelligence’ in 1975. What form did this period of political scepticism towards intelligence take?
Was it political? Certainly, with politicians castigating the CIA as the ‘Rogue Elephant’ of US foreign
policy from the floor of the Senate, leading to new laws and political mechanisms to hold the US
intelligence community to account. Was it cultural? Of course! It’s no coincidence that the year of
intelligence was both preceded and followed by Hollywood films that, for the first time, con-
demned the Agency as murderously amoral.25 Was it social? A quick glance at the Pew Research
Center’s long-standing study of US public trust in government, and what the results were in the
mid-1970s will offer an answer to that.26 Does it make sense to try to disentangle these elements in
order to understand the ‘year of intelligence’ as purely the result of political manoeuvring, or purely
the consequence of a misinformed and misguided cultural interpretation of the secret state? Not at
all. An integrative understanding is the only one that we can begin to offer a full picture of why
1975 happened the way it happened, and how the impact of that year of revelations about the
secret state has had an influence that can be found in the pages of a Don DeLillo novel, as much as
in the corridors of state. In what follows I want to elaborate upon a few key thematic areas of
interest for intelligence studies scholars, for which an integrative approach is changing, or could
change, our understanding of them.
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Secrecy
Until quite recently, official secrecy was a remarkably under-theorised aspect of governance and
international relations.27 Max Weber made the case for secrecy as a necessary precondition for
effective bureaucratic deliberation. Jeremy Bentham argued the opposite – that publicity was the
ideal to which all enlightened democracies should strive. And Georg Simmel noted the importance
of secrecy in regulating the flow and control of information, and therefore as a means to power.
But these theories, though seminal, formed only a small part of each of these author’s overarching
philosophical projects, no more than a single article in the case of Bentham and Simmel, and only a
few sketches in the service of a much wider argument in the case of Weber. Up until quite recently,
few have taken up the task of elaborating upon these ideas, or bringing new ways of thinking
about secrecy to the table. This is surprising, given the far-reaching implications of secrecy for
numerous disciplines, and especially when compared to the substantial body of work that has
emerged over many decades on the attendant concept of privacy.28
Perhaps as a result of the renewed interest in covert affairs in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the
last decade, however, has witnessed the publication of a number of major studies on secrecy from
a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Intelligence historians have offered book-length accounts of
the emergence of official secrecy in Britain and America, and how governments have dealt with
unwelcome disclosures.29 Political philosophers have tried to overcome the seemingly fundamental
contradiction of keeping secrets in an open society.30 And cultural and literary theorists have noted
the impact of government secrecy, particularly in the US, upon narratives of incredulity and
suspicion towards government institutions.31 Thanks to this multidisciplinary, and at times genu-
inely interdisciplinary, interest in secrecy, a new academic journal was recently launched, dedicated
to the study of secrecy and society. In the first issue, two of its contributors proclaimed the
inauguration of a new discipline, Secrecy Studies, noteworthy for its interdisciplinarity and meth-
odological innovation that provide a ‘foundation for the investigation of secrecy across the very
fabric of society.’32
This urge to study secrecy as a phenomenon that cuts across the different domains of human
experience is not a purely theoretical concern. It is also a practical impediment. For as David
Vincent noted, in one of the few studies that predated this new wave of secrecy scholarship:
‘Secrecy is a profoundly volatile compound’, the maintenance of which requires the subjective
commitment to systems of values and beliefs that cannot be fully comprehended by ‘legal and
procedural histories of the subject’.33 Moreover, as Vincent goes on to note, secrecy stands in a
symbiotic relationship with the issue of public trust. Thus, though the formal creation of govern-
ment secrets can be understood in terms of those laws and procedures, their consequences are
most profoundly felt in culture and society at large.
One of the more developed literature on the socio-cultural implications of secrecy is the study of
conspiracy theories. For if distrust is the natural corollary of secrecy, then conspiracy theories, or
‘the paranoid style’, as the historian Richard Hofstadter famously termed it, should be understood
as the condition that emerges when trust has all but evaporated. This is no longer the study of
anomalous political curiosities – Hofstadter regarded the paranoid style as a significant but fringe
phenomenon in American political life. Rather, political paranoia could now be regarded as one of
the fundamental issues of our times – it helped, in no small measure, to sweep Donald Trump into
office. It undergirds the discourse of populist parties across the globe on both the far left and far
right of the political spectrum, though the right, as in the aftermath of Watergate, have been more
successful in capitalising on this widespread distrust of government. It is the reason Donald Trump
and his ideological state apparatus in Breitbart News and other sources of popular suspicion have
so fiercely attacked the US intelligence community as the ‘Deep State’, gaining political capital in
the process.34 And it is why Trump has been able to so blithely dismiss intelligence reports of
Russian intercession in the 2016 election in support of his campaign – ‘These are the same people
that said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.’35 If Trump’s use of the CIA and FBI as
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political footballs in the service of his paranoid politics suggests anything, it is that the decline of
trust in the intelligence services has consequences far beyond the affairs of the intelligence services
themselves.
What role does secrecy play in all of this? For Hofstadter, among others, conspiracy theories
were the product of ‘uncommonly angry minds’, and this psychological explanation stuck in the
popular conception of conspiracy theorists as political demagogues or jaded cynics. But there is
nothing uncommon about conspiracy theories these days, nor does Hofstadter’s focus upon
individual psychology help us to grasp the material causes of conspiracy theories; such theories
might often be proven wrong, but they are theories about something and are usually responding
to real historical events or processes. More recent scholarship on conspiracy theories have stressed
the real causes of conspiracy theories in various iterations of the ‘no smoke without fire’ argument.
Kathryn Olmsted is perhaps the most forceful exponent of this perspective:
Since the First World War, officials of the U.S. government have encouraged conspiracy theories, sometimes
inadvertently, sometimes intentionally. They have engaged in conspiracies and used the cloak of national
security to hide their actions from the American people. . . If antigovernment conspiracy theorists get the
details wrong – and they often do – they get the basic issue right: it is the secret actions of government that
are the real enemies of democracy.36
For Olmsted, the antidote is simple: ‘more government openness. When Americans believe that
their government is truthful, open, and accountable, they are more willing to trust it.’37
Unfortunately for those of us who believe greater openness is a good in itself, the correlation
between transparency and trust might not be so straightforward. US public trust in government
was at an all-time high during the Second World War, and the decade and a half that followed, a
period of rapidly expanding government secrecy with almost no formal accountability mechanisms
for overseeing the intelligence community. It was also a period defined by a particularly deferent
media, who acquiesced to the CIA and FBI’s sanctification of secrecy.38 When the US intelligence
community has opened up, or been forced to open up by a more combative press, such as in the
mid-1970s, public trust slumped. One of the few upswings in trust in the last fifty years, as Olmsted
notes, was in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, a period of time marked by what James Der Derian
has described as a global in terrorem, a moment in which critical enquiry, particularly amongst the
very journalists tasked with encouraging greater openness, succumbed to the flag-waving and
wagon-circling that followed the event.39
Conspiracy theories have themselves often paved the way to increased openness, acting as a
form of populist accountability on the secret state. But the declassification of, for example, millions
of records in relation to the Kennedy assassination following the provocations of Oliver Stone in
the early 1990s has failed to sate the appetite for conspiracy theories.40 Indeed, arguably the
opposite has taken place. ‘[T]he sheer volume of Kennedy assassination materials’, argues Peter
Knight, ‘. . .threatens to plunge the case into an infinite abyss of suspicion, into what Jean
Baudrillard has termed “a vertigo of interpretations.”’41
The causal link between official secrecy and conspiracy theories seems relatively clear. However,
perhaps the rot of distrust that has set in since the end of the 1960s in American society and
culture runs too deep for the occasional programme of declassification to reverse the seemingly
inexorable trend towards suspicion. This is the underlying premise of one of the most remarkable
books on secrecy in recent years: Timothy Melley’s The Covert Sphere. Its theoretical and metho-
dological ingenuity and its meditation on the interwoven nature of fiction and fact in relation to
secrecy, as well as its far-reaching conclusions, certainly meet the two defining criteria of the
cultural turn that I listed in my introduction. Melley argues:
‘[T]hat the development of the National Security State, with its emphasis on secrecy and deception, helped
transform the cultural status of fiction as it relates to discourses of “fact,” such as journalism and history. As
state secrecy shifted the conditions of public knowledge, certain forms of fiction became crucial in helping
Americans imagine, or fantasize about, US foreign policy.’42
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Melley proposes the existence of a ‘covert sphere’, ‘a cultural imaginary shaped by both institutional
secrecy and public fascination with the secret work of the state.’43 Unlike Jurgen Habermas’ notion of
the public sphere – a space of rational-critical debate where ‘the princely authority [of] state secrets’ is
kept in check by ideas and policies that emerge from the cut and thrust of open deliberation – the
covert sphere is ‘marked by a structural irrationality’, because secrecy undermines the traditional
epistemologies of factual discourses, destabilising their empirical basis by actively distorting the
historical record, and outlawing disclosures of fact.44 Into this empirical void flood ‘narrative fictions,
such as novels, films, television series, and electronic games’ that offer speculative fantasies about the
workings of the secret state. Unlike numerous intelligence historians, Melley’s purpose here is not to
discredit these fictions as so muchmisleading bunk, but to recognise their profound agency in shaping
political discourses about state secrecy in lieu of non-fictional alternatives. This occurs on both sides of
the debate. Supreme Court Justices (among other political actors) have cited 24’s Jack Bauer in defence
of the CIA’s secret programme of ‘enhanced interrogation’.45 Likewise, Orwell and Kafka have become
symbolic touchstones for the political opposition to the state secrecy that enshrouds the mass
surveillance activities revealed by Edward Snowden.46
But there is an even more far-reaching conclusion that can be drawn from this observation of
the impact of increasing secrecy upon the relative epistemologies of fictional vs. non-fictional
discourses about the secret state. Namely, that the growth of the national security state in the
decades after the Second World War, and its attendant secrets, was ‘the crucible of
postmodernism’.47 Ann Douglas makes this case succinctly:
The extreme scepticism about the possibility of disinterested knowledge and language that postmodernism
sponsors. . . makes most sense when taken as a straightforward description of the extremes of official
dishonesty characteristic of the cold war era.48
Could it be that official secrecy, the bread and butter of intelligence studies, is responsible for such
an epochal shift? As Melley notes, ‘[c]hronologically, the answer is yes. Postmodernism arose as the
Cold War consensus of the 1950s disintegrated. . .’49 What caused that disintegration of the Cold
War consensus? Historians have offered numerous answers to this question: the rise of the baby
boomers, the flourishing of the counterculture, the civil rights and anti-war movements, the death
of President Kennedy, an increasingly recalcitrant media.50 But perhaps the single most significant
explanation is that as Americans began to learn, in the words of Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, that their
government ‘would lie to them’, through mounting disclosures about the activities of the secret
state (the Bay of Pigs, the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, and the 1975 ‘year of intelligence’),
Americans stopped trusting their government.51
This mounting distrust was the inevitable consequence of the rapid expansion of the secret state in
the post-war decades, and it is a sentiment that can be found across the fabric of American society in
the late-1960s and beyond. It can be found in the proclamations by anti-war activists, in speeches on
the floor of the Senate, inNew York Times editorials, in themovies, and in the pages of Don DeLillo, Joan
Didion or Thomas Pynchon novels. Whether one identifies this culture of suspicion in the pages of a
fictional novel, or in major political speeches of the period, one is discovering the same integrated
phenomenon. To try to disentangle the culture of suspicion from the politics of suspicion is counter-
productive, for the culture of suspicion is the politics of suspicion and vice versa. This is where a
structural understanding of causality can help us to account for the implications of state secrecy,
implications that permeated far beyond the corridors of state.
What are the implications of this? First, it requires us to move away from the study of
representations, or culture as a detached and passive reflection of society, towards an under-
standing of culture as active and integrated into political and social phenomena. It is in this way, in
the words of Clifford Geertz, ‘coloring experience in the light they cast it in’, that cultural texts
reciprocate the political agency that is inflicted upon them by the world they represent. The
mounting suspicion that secrecy wrought, in this way, can be regarded as an emergent ‘structure
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of feeling’ during the second half of the twentieth century, one that cannot be properly under-
stood in a disintegrated way.52
On a practical note, a full recognition of the far-reaching effects of secrecy might entail a
reappraisal of classification and declassification procedures. For if the spread of conspiracy theories
and suspicion in response to official secrecy represents a fundamental threat to liberal democracy,
as many theorists believe they do, then the keeping of secrets that generates excessive suspicion in
the cultural and social domains might need to be re-evaluated to consider whether the national
security interests that they seek to protect are outweighed by the national security threat of
undermining public confidence in the institutions that undergird liberal democracy.53 In this
way, secrecy is a double-edged sword that oftentimes threatens the very social fabric that it
seeks to protect. Though greater openness might not be an immediate panacea for the widespread
cultural suspicion that has set in since the end of the 1960s, the limiting of unnecessary secrecy
might avoid compounding public distrust. In this way the cultural turn in intelligence studies is
both a theoretical and deeply practical imperative.
Publicity and public relations
If further confirmation were needed of the significance of the cultural sphere upon the
intelligence services, one need look no further than the mounting efforts of the intelligence
community, and in particular the CIA, to shape popular discourses about their activities.54 The
end of the Cold War entailed a renewed need for intelligence services to make the public
case for their continued existence.55 This was not the first time the CIA were forced to ‘go
public’ in order to face down their critics. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World
War, General William Donovan launched a major public relations offensive to make the case
for a permanent peacetime civilian intelligence agency. The creation of the CIA just a few
years later is testament to the success of that campaign, with Hollywood movies, newspaper
articles and several memoirs extolling (and usually exaggerating) the Office of Strategic
Service’s (OSS) wartime role, and in the process answering critics in the American press
who warned against the creation of ‘An American Gestapo’.56 In the mid-1970s, in response
to the ‘Family Jewels’ revelations and the season of investigation that followed, a series of
DCIs shifted the CIA’s approach from blanket secrecy to one of information management.
Under Admiral Stansfield Turner’s directorship (1977–1981), CIA public affairs was formalised
for the first time, only for it to be curtailed by a renewed culture of secrecy during the
Reagan years.57
Today CIA public relations activities are more extensive than ever before, perhaps in recognition
of the fact, as David Shamus McCarthy argues in his authoritative history of CIA public relations,
that secrecy in the age of mass media depends, paradoxically, on effective PR.58 But the CIA were
actually relative latecomers to the public relations game, believing as they did in the early Cold War
that blanket secrecy could be maintained. J. Edgar Hoover was a master public relations expert, and
crafted the ‘G-Man’ image of the FBI from the very earliest days of the bureau’s history.59 The US
military, likewise, have maintained close relations with Hollywood and the wider American media
since the beginning of the twentieth century.60 More recently, in the wake of the Edward Snowden
revelations, the NSA and GCHQ have also notably increased their public relations activities.61
As with secrecy, the history of intelligence agencies’ public relations activities was a neglected
field until quite recently. But a wave of studies published in the last five years have transformed the
subject into a substantial sub-field of intelligence studies.62 What general conclusions can we draw
from these studies, and how does this relate to the cultural turn in intelligence studies? One of the
key implications, following McCarthy’s arguments about public relations as the Janus face of
secrecy, is that modern intelligence agencies are engaged in a dynamic process of information
management. Defining what is made public, and how it is made public, has become as important
as defining what is kept secret. Secrecy, as Simmel noted, is a means of controlling the flow of
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information, but equally important for intelligence agencies today is shaping the context, timing
and reception of the information that does get into the public domain. As the scandals surround-
ing the CIA, NSA and FBI in recent memory demonstrate, the intelligence services have not always
succeeded in this. But they have certainly stepped up their efforts in this regard. The CIA managed
to get their narrative of enhanced interrogation into the public domain via a Hollywood movie
before the Senate Intelligence Committee Report on CIA torture roundly rejected both the ethics
and the efficacy of their notorious ‘enhanced interrogation’ methods. The FBI’s continued support
of numerous Hollywood productions about their work, as well as their use of celebrities to boost
their recruitment, shows that the Bureau’s adeptness for PR did not disappear with Hoover’s
death.63 Likewise, as already mentioned, the NSA and GCHQ seem to have begun the process of
adjustment to their newfound celebrity by enhancing their public relations activities.
Another general conclusion that can be drawn from this new literature is that the history of
intelligence agencies, and the way in which the general public understand their work, is, to a
significant extent, culturally constructed. The intelligence agencies themselves recognise this as
much as the academic literature, otherwise why would they invest resources into liaising with
filmmakers, television producers, writers, memoirists and members of the press? The intelligence
agencies echo the dubious claim of the Pentagon, that their relationship with the media is
intended solely to ensure the historical accuracy of the cultural products made about them. The
assistance the Pentagon has lent to such Hollywood fantasies as Iron Man and Transformers, or the
CIA to Patriot Games, Meet the Parents, and even an episode of the popular television programme
Top Chef, filmed at the Agency’s Langley headquarters, suggests that they are involved in a process
of their own mythmaking as much as the fantastical spy features they condemn for playing fast and
loose with historical accuracy. Indeed, when evaluating the relative merits of spy fictions that
depict the Agency in a sympathetic light, CIA public affairs staff appear much more tolerant of
historical inaccuracies than when dealing, often scathingly, with more critical fictions.64 In an oft-
cited 1991 report on greater CIA openness (which was ironically classified as secret), a task force set
out six core principles that should underline the Agency’s public messaging going forwards;
principle six was ‘preserve the mystique’.65
An integrated understanding of historical causality, central to the cultural turn, sees cultural texts as
important actors in the dynamic and continuously politically contested historical identity of the
intelligence agencies. The significance of fictional texts is therefore not determined by their relative
historical accuracy – ‘[y]ou wouldn’t go toMacbeth to learn about the history of Scotland’ – but by the
ways in which they have constructed meaning, and in turn shaped our understanding, of the world
beyond the page.66 A world, in the words of Jean Baudrillard, that is ‘always already reproduced’.67
Understanding intelligence history as this dynamic, culturally constructed, and highly politicised
battleground, comprised of a multitude of texts, enables us to account for the CIA’s support for
positive fantasies about their work, as well as the role of popular perceptions of intelligence agencies.
Mentalities
Another area in which a ‘turn to culture’ might illuminate our discipline, is the study of the way in
which intelligence products are influenced by cultural attitudes, beliefs and worldviews. This is
related to, but methodologically distinct from, the extant scholarly interest in the politicisation of
intelligence.68 Policymakers undoubtedly (and unavoidably) exert a profound influence upon the
intelligence cycle, but what about less tangible but no less real influences from beyond the world
of statecraft? Despite their professional commitment to ‘objectivity and integrity of judgment’,
intelligence officers are not immune to prejudices and unconscious biases that afflict all epistemic
communities.69 But the study of ‘mentalities’ involves something more than examining whether
this or that assessment was distorted by prevailing attitudes (although it can involve that too).
Mechanistic explanations for the impact of a given cultural text upon a real-world outcome are
notoriously difficult to come by. When they are found, such as the impact of the 1983 blockbuster
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War Games on the development of Ronald Reagan’s nascent cyber-security strategy, or the impact
of Ian Fleming’s wild fantasies upon CIA covert operations in Cuba, they tend towards the
anecdotal.70 Culture is powerful precisely because its influence is diffuse, subtle, and accretive.
Attitudes and beliefs are not forged from attendance at a single play, or the reading of one novel,
rather, they emerge from a complex accumulation of discourses, both fictional and non-fictional,
which shape our behaviour, and the way we view the world. For that reason, they are all the more
pervasive, and their influence is that much harder to prove.
But the study of mentalities concerns itself not only with what is said but also what is not said. Here
again, there is a distinction from the study of politicisation. The Annales School, who first conceptua-
lised the history of mentalities, saw their task as the assemblage of an ‘inventory of mental equipment’
in a given age in order to determine what was, or was not, discursively possible at a certain moment.
Lucien Febvre, for example, famously argued that atheismwas so ‘beyond the ken of sixteenth-century
man’ that even radical sceptics like François Rabeleis could not conceive unbelief.71 ‘Secular thought
would become possible only as man created an autonomous secular world.’72
What was the ‘inventory of mental equipment’ that intelligence analysts possessed during the
Second World War, the Cold War, or today’s War on Terror? What was ‘beyond the ken’ of Allen
Dulles, Tom Braden or James Jesus Angleton? Are different conclusions discursively available today
that might not have been sixty years ago? Was it possible for American intelligence analysts to
think outside of the framework of anti-communism in their intelligence assessments of foreign
threats and the motives of enemy leaders? In the broader fields of international history and Cold
War historiography, these kinds of questions have been pursued with alacrity in recent decades by
post-revisionist scholars. The Cold War is now regarded as ‘a conflict that was more than geopo-
litics, military deployments, more than Presidents and General Secretaries, summits and treaties,
economic competition and the Bomb.’73 A renewed focus on ideology, not just Soviet ideology, but
American and Western ideology as well, has mounted a significant challenge to the realist
paradigm that understands the Cold War in terms of rational actors making calculated decisions
to maximise strategic interest.74
The question of the extent to which US Cold War ideology, and in particular, the domestic anti-
communist hysteria of the period, permeated the intelligence community, and therefore their
assessments of foreign threats, is a complex one. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI is the most obvious example
of a leader and an organisation whose entire outlook on the world was significantly shaped by
their vehement anti-communism. As Ellen Schrecker famously put it, had ‘observers known in the
1950s what they have learned since the 1970s, when the Freedom of Information Act opened the
Bureau’s files, “McCarthyism” would probably be called “Hooverism.”’75 But in the case of the CIA,
the question is more complex. During the height of McCarthyism, early CIA leaders like Allen Dulles
and Walter Bedell Smith were certainly anti-communists, but their views were more nuanced than
Hoover’s, and their perceived liberal elitism put them in McCarthy’s crosshairs.76 Moreover, as
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones argues, the CIA were adept at exploiting Cold War anxieties to their advan-
tage, suggesting a degree of ideological self-awareness that made them something more than
passive converts.77 Nevertheless, given the pervasiveness of Cold War anxieties that permeated
every level of government and society, it seems reasonable to ask to what extent did irrational fears
colour the CIA’s intelligence assessments of Soviet intentions during the Cold War? 78
The Annales School, along with contemporaries such as Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and
Edward Said, all shared the conviction that seemingly rational discourses were often significantly
shaped by ‘irrational’ subjective cultural perceptions. This flies in the face of the US intelligence
community’s commitment to objectivism. As Mark Stout has noted, one of the defining features of
American intelligence ‘culture’ is ‘the idea that truth is accessible and that “analysis” to discover
that truth is an essential intelligence function.’79 But were intelligence officers really able to
completely detach themselves from dominant cultural perceptions and anxieties that circulated
at the time they performed their analysis?
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Another exciting new field of enquiry in intelligence studies that confounds the positivist
epistemology of the intelligence community are recent studies of the way in which orientalist
discourses shaped the American and British IC’s assessments of the Middle East. Edward Said, father
of the concept of Orientalism, or the idea that Western discourses (both scientific and literary) of
the Middle East cast it as an exotic and primitive ‘other’, against which notions of Western
‘civilisation’ defined itself, thus legitimating imperial intervention in the region, is a key proponent
of an integrated approach to culture, politics and society: ‘[Culture] is a historical force possessing
its own configurations, ones that intertwine with those in the socio-economic sphere.’80 In an
important article, Dina Rezk demonstrates how ‘a history of intelligence can also be a history of
culture, ideas and mentalité’, by demonstrating the way in which key CIA assessments during the
Cold War constructed ‘The Arab’ personality as a monolithic other, devoid of social conscience,
apathetic, quixotic, and prone to violent paroxysms.81 In a similar vein, Hugh Wilford has shown
how Kermit Roosevelt, a key actor in the CIA-instigated overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in
Iran, was significantly influenced by British imperialist and orientalist discourses of the Middle East,
such as Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, and the writings of T.E. Lawrence. Tantalisingly, Wilford points to
other possible cultural frameworks, in particular prescribed notions of masculinity, that may have
shaped Kermit Roosevelt’s, and the CIA’s, thinking and conduct in the region.82
Cold War orthodoxy cast the Soviets as irrational and dogmatically ideological, which they
contrasted with American pragmatism and intellectual freedom. Our understanding of the respec-
tive intelligence communities during the Cold War has largely followed this framework – the KGB
were straightjacketed into reaching conclusions that fit Soviet dogma, whilst the CIA were free to
pursue objective truth, and at times speak truth to power.83 But the new wave of post-revisionist
scholarship since the fall of the Berlin Wall has argued, convincingly, that US foreign policy was
often also dictated by ideology, not pragmatism.84 Were intelligence officials guided by ideology
too? What else shaped their vision of the world? As Odd Arne Westad writes in relation to Soviet
dogma, ‘it is necessary to establish a wider and more useful definition of ideology, encompassing
not only a written tradition of authoritative texts and their exegesis but also credenda formed by
personal and historical experience.’85 How did notions of race, class, and gender, especially during
the early Cold War when the CIA were comprised from a relatively homogenous white, male and
elite demographic, impact their conclusions? The time has come to consider western intelligence
officials not as cloistered scientists, objectively interpreting fixed truths about the world, but as
cultural and social beings, profoundly shaped by their ‘inventories of mental equipment.’
Conclusion
The elevation of ‘culture’ in intelligence studies and the cognate fields of international history, and
Cold War historiography has generated important new lines of enquiry in recent decades. But as
Scott Lucas warns, there is a paradoxical danger that whilst we elevate certain kinds of study, we
simultaneously limit our lines of enquiry to an ‘anodyne focus’ on the official, i.e., cultural
diplomacy as an instrument of the state; or to the anecdotal, i.e., the oftentimes apocryphal tales
of spy fiction being directly translated into spy fact; or the remedial, i.e., pointing out where spy
fiction deviates from spy fact, or the banal conclusion that the real world of espionage is stranger
than fiction.86 All of the above approaches, though valuable in their own terms, treat ‘the cultural’
as a separate sphere of human activity, distinct from the more consequential domain of politics. To
see culture as merely a reflection of politics, or a domain that occasionally bumps into the properly
political world, is to misunderstand the complex interplay that exists between statecraft and the
highly mediated world that we all inhabit. As Melvyn Leffler put it:
Historians, like political scientists, must abandon their customary binary categories, test new theoretical
approaches, and integrate notions of culture and identity with an understanding of political process and
political institutions as well as with an examination of material and strategic interests.87
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If the recent proliferation of cultural approaches to intelligence studies is to constitute a fully
fledged ‘cultural turn’, then we must recognise the expansive possibilities that are available to us
when we see intelligence agencies, and intelligence agents, as inhabitants of the world they seek
to analyse. It is time for the ‘ghetto’ of international relations to reintegrate itself back into the
community. For in reality, it never was, and never could be, apart.
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